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Once policy has been developed and agreed upon, it 
requires implementation. This phase is rarely straightfor-
ward – indeed it has been termed the ‘Achilles’ heel’ of 
the UK political system (Harris & Rutter, 2014). The idea 
of simply moving from one stable state to another as a 
result of planned change is widely acknowledged to be 
at odds with work on complex systems (Williams, 2015). 
Explanations for how and why policy does, or does not, 
become implemented include everything from the initial 
policy design to the resistance of the local population 
(Spillane et al., 2006).
Rather than just let policies drift into full or partial 
failure, governments are beginning to take an  interest 
in ways in which the implementation of policy can be 
strengthened and supported. This interest includes 
improved preparation of a policy, its prioritisation, better 
tracking of policy to assess its impact, and – the subject of 
this paper – implementation support. Given the relative 
novelty of these types of approaches, little exists by way 
of an established evidence base testifying to their success 
or otherwise.
To help tackle this deficit, an evaluation of the 
Implementation Support programme introduced when 
the Care Act 2014 was passed in England, ending in 
the first quarter of 2016, was undertaken. Adult social 
care is a devolved matter and there is separate legisla-
tion determined elsewhere by the Scottish Government 
and Parliament, the Welsh Government and Assembly, 
and the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly. The 
Implementation Support (IS) programme was confined to 
England, therefore the arrangements elsewhere in the UK 
are outside the scope of this study.
Following a brief overview of the Care Act and its purpose, 
and a few reflections on why implementation support mer-
its attention, we present the key findings from our study. 
The study was one of a suite of research projects exam-
ining various aspects of the Care Act’s implementation. It 
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The Case of the Care Act 2014
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Context: Policy implementation is an often overlooked stage when policy is introduced. Too often the 
result is policy failure caused by overly optimistic expectations, implementation in dispersed governance, 
inadequate collaborative policy-making, and the vagaries of the political cycle.
The Care Act 2014 introduced the most significant change in social care law in England for 60 years. 
Given the complexity of the changes, the Department of Health and Social Care and its key partners intro-
duced an Implementation Support Programme (ISP) to increase the likelihood of smooth  implementation.
Objective: To assess the impact of the ISP on local implementation of the Care Act and develop a frame-
work for understanding the requirements of a successful ISP.
Methods: Analysis was undertaken of the relevant theoretical and conceptual literature in addition to a 
review of support programmes for other national policies. The empirical study of the impact of the Care 
Act’s ISP, conducted in six local authorities, focused on three levels of activity that shaped outcomes: 
national, regional and local. Data were collected through interviews with key stakeholders at each level.
Findings: The ISP enjoyed several successes including: helping to secure policy legitimacy, developing 
stakeholder engagement, sustaining political support, and ensuring the readiness of local implementation 
agencies.
Limitations: The empirical research was confined to six English local authorities which limits drawing 
general conclusions applicable to the whole country.
Implications: Little evidence exists on the value of ISPs. The research goes some way to closing the gap 
and offers provisional messages on their value to policy-makers and practitioners.
Keywords: Implementation support; policy failure; social care; local government
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was conducted by a team based at the University of Kent 
and Newcastle University. The views expressed in this 
paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those 
of the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR), the 
Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), or its arm’s 
length bodies or other government departments.
The Care Act 2014
The term ‘adult social care’ is commonly used to refer 
to personal care and practical support for older people, 
adults with physical disabilities, learning disabilities, or 
mental health issues, as well as support for those car-
ing for them informally. The use of the term has become 
established in most governmental, professional, and aca-
demic writing, largely replacing the former general terms 
such as ‘personal social services’ and ‘community care’ 
(Gray & Birrell, 2013). While earlier conceptions stressed 
the residual nature of support for those in greatest need, 
more recent formulations emphasise wider ideas of indi-
vidual and collective wellbeing. Indeed, it was the very 
fact that this policy domain had been the subject of such 
change that new legislation to tidy, freshen, and overhaul 
the sector was thought to be required.
Within England, local authorities have responsibility for 
oversight of their local adult social care systems within a 
national framework of policy and legislation. Local care 
systems operate as mixed markets of provision.
The Care Act 2014 introduced the most significant and 
ambitious change in social care law in England for 60 
years, fundamentally overhauling the entire care and sup-
port system for adults, older people, and their carers. It 
consisted of two phases, the first phase being introduced 
in April 2015 with phase 2 to be introduced in 2016. 
However, in July 2015 it was announced that Phase 2 
(introducing a cap on care costs) was to be deferred until 
April 2020 and has since been abandoned. New proposals 
are expected in a Green Paper but this has been deferred 
in part due to the impact of the ongoing Brexit develop-
ments on government business and, more recently, of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The delay is relevant insofar as it 
reflects a failure of policy implementation in an area of 
significant public concern.
The Care Act was seen as a significant part of a new 
approach to supporting adults with social care needs and 
the delivery of adult social care services. Its overarching 
objectives were to reduce reliance on formal care, pro-
mote people’s independence and wellbeing, and give 
people more control over their own care and support. The 
Act was generally welcomed and achieved a high degree 
of consensus aided by a collaborative approach among 
the key partners who were intent on ensuring that the 
policy was made to stick when it came to implementa-
tion. Central to this commitment to implementation was 
the development of the Implementation Support (IS) pro-
gramme noted above. Whilst all changes in policy, espe-
cially those of a complex nature, might benefit from some 
form of implementation support, it should be easier to 
achieve where the key parties are in agreement over the 
direction and objectives of the policy. This ‘collaborative 
policy design’ (Ansell et al., 2017) is the central feature of 
the Care Act IS programme. Before turning to it, we briefly 
reflect more generally on the nature of implementation 
support within public policy.
Implementation Support: Why is it Necessary?
Addressing policy failure and making policy stick by pay-
ing greater attention to implementation are becoming 
critical concerns, especially in the face of deep-seated and 
stubborn policy challenges that are increasingly acknowl-
edged to be more complex and not subject to simple, lin-
ear solutions (Holmes et al., 2017). Four broad contribu-
tors to policy failure can be identified: overly optimistic 
expectations; implementation in dispersed governance; 
inadequate collaborative policy-making; and the vagaries 
of the political cycle (McConnell, 2015). We have elabo-
rated on each of these contributors elsewhere (Hudson 
et al., 2019). They may be regarded as the implementa-
tion challenges that would have to be met by an imple-
mentation support programme of the kind with which 
we are concerned here. Certainly, the Care Act required 
expectations to be managed; governance to be in place 
at multiple levels – macro (national), meso (regional and 
strategic local authority), and local (service provider) lev-
els; the active engagement of many different stakeholders; 
and a sustained commitment over time to ensure that the 
changes sought were sufficiently embedded. Building on 
McConnell’s work, we developed an overarching frame-
work to structure our analysis (see Figure 1).
Implementation support can take a variety of forms, 
with the mechanisms selected varying widely. They may, 
or may not, be measurable with some taking a visible, 
tangible form (e.g., regional meetings), some being of 
an experiential nature (e.g., inspiring leadership and/
or management), and others being theorised (e.g., par-
ticipation in regional meetings will facilitate ‘x’ and ‘y’). 
Mechanisms are not ‘things’ (or mediators) but part of an 
account of causality which only works when explaining 
the context within which they operate, and the outcome 
to which they contribute (Emmel, 2013). The identifica-
tion of mechanisms shaping policy implementation sup-
port is important as it aids explanations in regard to why 
interconnections should occur. In addition, mechanisms 
can be used to describe the causal relations within a sys-
tem which generate uniformity (Pawson, 2008). By link-
ing these levels of explanation, there is the opportunity 
to transcend the divide between top-down and bottom-
up approaches towards policy implementation (Sabatier, 
1986, cited in McEvoy & Richards, 2003).
Implementation support mechanisms can be identi-
fied as having one of three main purposes: managing 
and regulating; problem-solving; and capacity building 
(Gold, 2014). All three were evident in varying degrees in 
the IS programme which accompanied the Care Act 2014 
and to which we now turn.
The Care Act 2014 Implementation Support 
Programme
Given the complexity of the changes introduced by the 
Care Act, the DHSC – known as the Department of Health 
at the time of the passage of the Act – and its key partners 
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decided that a comprehensive programme of implementa-
tion support should be put in place both to ensure legisla-
tive readiness and increase the likelihood of smooth imple-
mentation (Hughes & Caunt, 2013). Three principles were 
established which underpinned the support programme:
•	 Clarity of expectations and requirements: this was to 
cover the new legislative framework, financial issues, 
and the outcomes to be achieved, all of which were 
to be effectively communicated to meet the needs of 
different audiences.
•	 Flexible products: these were to be accessible and 
drawn upon in a way that met local needs.
•	 Collaborative infrastructure: one that supported col-
laboration at local, regional, and national levels 
through an ongoing two-way supportive dialogue. 
Underpinning this infrastructure was the close rela-
tionship established between the three key partners: 
the DHSC, the Local Government Association (LGA), 
and Association of Directors of Adult Social Services 
(ADASS), the latter two being national membership 
bodies for local authorities (LGA) and Directors within 
them (ADASS).
The arrangements put in place to deliver on these princi-
ples involved the establishment of three key organisational 
innovations: a Programme Board; a Delivery Board and Pro-
gramme Management Office; and a regional infrastructure. 
While some aspects of these features of support had been 
present in other policy programmes, the main innovation 
was that stakeholders were partners, taking on responsibil-
ity and not just giving advice. Figure 2 provides an illustra-
tive overview of the programme structure established for 
implementing the Care Act (National Audit Office, 2015).
The Programme Board was upwardly accountable to 
the DHSC Major Programmes Board and had beneath it 
a Programme Management Office, a Support Delivery 
Board, and a raft of work streams. It had three key func-
tions: support, assurance, and delivery. The Delivery Board 
had a much more hands-on role being tasked with driv-
ing timely and effective delivery; ensuring risks and other 
issues were identified and mitigated; and assessing data 
to monitor impact and drive the delivery of anticipated 
programme benefits. The Programme Management Office 
was established to support the work of the Board and was 
seen as central to the fulfilment of all three Board func-
tions. In recognition of the potentially wide gap between 
central government and a multiplicity of local authorities, 
the decision was taken to develop a regional dimension 
to act as a conduit between regions and the Programme 
Management Office. The regional tier was not another 
organisational layer but amounted to some modest fund-
ing being found to support the regional leads who were 
left free to determine their own ways of working through 
networks of local authorities. Regional level support was 
anticipated to facilitate rapid dissemination of the latest 
tools and advice; increase the pace of local implementa-
tion; and link into assurance mechanisms where the local 
pace was thought to be falling behind. Organisationally 
this level of support was intended to build on arrange-
ments for existing models connected with other pro-
grammes, such as Health and Wellbeing Boards (which 
bring together local health and care leaders to col-
laboratively improve outcomes for their populations), 
Transforming Excellence in Adult Social Care, and NHS 
Vanguards (sites leading the development of new models 
of care, some of which are overlaps of health and adult 
social care).
Figure 1: A Framework for the assessment of implementation support programmes.
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On the issue of the cost of the IS programme, the two 
stakeholders outside of the Department of Health (DH) – 
LGA and ADASS – funded their own input. In addition, DH 
made available modest funding to support the regional 
links. It may be worth noting, too, that the NAO (2015) 
raised no concerns about value for money in relation to 
the monitoring and support arrangements.
This brief descriptive account of the Care Act’s IS pro-
gramme is testimony to the seriousness with which the 
mission was undertaken at central level. It suggests a keen 
awareness of the potential danger of policy failure and a 
determination to avoid it in ways that could mark it out 
as different and distinctive. The need for implementation 
to be in the hands of a multiplicity of local agencies – 
statutory, voluntary, and independent – is a key feature 
of the context surrounding the Care Act. Although highly 
detailed statutory guidance (the epitome of a top-down 
approach) was produced, there was also an appreciation 
of the influence of local contexts and dispersed power 
bases and the need to take these into account.
Method
Our research, conducted between early 2017 and mid-
2018 and funded by the DHSC Policy Research Programme, 
which comes under the auspices of the NIHR, focused on 
implementation support at three levels: macro (national), 
meso (regional and strategic local authority), and micro 
(local service delivery). Data were explored in three key 
areas: analysis of relevant theoretical and conceptual lit-
erature, a review of the support programmes (if any) for 
a number of previous and current national policy pro-
grammes, and an empirical study of the Care Act IS pro-
gramme itself. In order to understand better the reasons 
for establishing the Care Act IS programme at national 
level, three data sources were utilised: documentary anal-
ysis of Care Act Programme Board minutes; information 
on Care Act Programme Board actions; and an analysis of 
10 semi-structured interviews conducted with members 
of the Programme Board. A number of documents were 
produced for the Programme Board setting out ‘visions 
and priorities’ for implementation support, one of which 
provided a succinct explanation of the need for an IS pro-
gramme:
A traditional approach to providing implementation 
support is unlikely to be able to meet the needs of all 
organisations given their breadth, role in providing 
social care and support and particular local circum-
stances. Similarly, those charged with implementa-
tion also have challenging financial constraints, 
Figure 2: Programme structure for implementing the Care Act.
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other related policy issues such as Integration Trans-
formation Fund, corporate requirements and/or 
partnership arrangements to address (Hughes, 
2013: p.1).
The document cites a number of advantages in having a 
distinctive implementation support programme, includ-
ing collaboration among stakeholders, clarity in dialogue, 
and flexibility in the programme management tools. 
Additionally, capacity – in terms of resources and finance 
– is advanced as an issue that several organisations in the 
public sector face. There is also a recognition that ‘…no 
one single approach will be universally applicable to all 
involved and that a heavily directed approach would nei-
ther be well received nor taken up’ (ibid:p.2).
To explore the issues arising at the meso (regional) level, 
interviews were conducted with five regional leads. At 
the micro (locality) level, six local authority case studies 
were undertaken which entailed interviews with senior 
managers, operational staff, and focus groups made up 
of service users and carers. The local authority areas were 
chosen to reflect the diversity present within English local 
government (see Table 1). Research approval was sought 
from the Association of Directors of Adult Social Services 
and granted on 21st July 2017, and HRA Social Services 
Research ethical approval for data collection with ser-
vice users was obtained on 23rd February 2018 (Ref: 17/
IEC08/0050). A final research report was published in late 
2019 (Peckham et al., 2019).
Mapping Implementation Support in Other 
Policy Domains
As part of the preparations for the field work under-
taken to assess the value and impact of the Care Act IS 
programme we conducted a rapid mapping exercise of 
other English policies with not dissimilar aims to those 
of the Care Act in order to understand what, if any, policy 
support had been made available. The aim was to estab-
lish if there were general lessons regarding how support 
processes may best be developed to aid the local imple-
mentation of national policy. It is perhaps notable that no 
published review of the issue of implementation support 
exists. The search strategy was guided by the knowledge 
and experience of the research team, and by the external 
advisory group which guided and informed the research. 
Five criteria governed the selection of policies: scale (was 
it a national policy applicable to local areas across the 
country?); purpose (was the focus on implementation 
support?); reach (was support extended to every locality?); 
learning (was there an evaluation or other evidence base?); 
and significance (did the policy have a statutory underpin-
ning and guidance?). The mapping exercise initially iden-
tified fifteen policies which, after reviewing them against 
our selection criteria, led to a focus on five of these: the 
Community Care Support Force, Sure Start, Health and 
Wellbeing Boards, the Troubled Families Programme, and 
the NHS Vanguards. Although many of the policies them-
selves had been subject to an independent evaluation, few 
of the studies detailed the approaches of implementation 
support (if any) that had been offered. Further informa-
tion about the rapid review can be found in Chapter 3 of 
the final research report (Peckham et al., 2019).
In the light of our rapid review of other policies, the 
main conclusion to draw is that implementation support 
has tended to be regarded as somewhat marginal to suc-
cessful policy implementation – at best a useful accessory, 
but not thought to be central to the success of a policy. 
Such a finding, although disappointing, serves to under-
score the importance of our study of implementation sup-
port in regard to the Care Act.
Against this context of the availability of implemen-
tation support in other policy domains, the Care Act IS 
programme was both unusual and distinctive. Although 
the other policies we examined shared some of the same 
approaches to implementation support, the Care Act 
employed a more extensive range of support mechanisms 
in order to address every aspect of implementation (e.g., 
nationally produced guidance, regional level working 
groups, training, stocktake reporting mechanisms). It was 
also widely welcomed and not considered to be burden-
some or an unhelpful imposition.
Finally, and perhaps not so surprising given the limited 
attention it has received, our mapping of other  policies, 
and the implementation support provided, shows 
Table 1: Case studies.
Local authority case study Population size (2017) Urban/rural
North East metropolitan 
district unitary authority
200–300,000
percentage 65years+ – 17%
Urban/rural split – 99%/1%
Smaller northern  unitary 
authority
100–200,000
percentage 65years+ – 19.5%




percentage 65years+ – 17%
Urban/rural split – 82%/18%
Large southern county 
council
over 1 million
percentage 65years+ – 17.9%
Urban/rural split – 72%/28%
Rural eastern county council 100–200,000
percentage 65years+ – 19.8
Urban/rural split – 61%/39%
London Borough Council 200–300,000
percentage 65years+ – 10.3%
Urban/rural split – 100%/0%
Hunter et al: Do Policy Implementation Support Programmes Work? 
The Case of the Care Act 2014
201
negligible learning from the type of IS programme we have 
described in respect of the Care Act. The implementation 
of each policy has proceeded in separate silos, seemingly 
oblivious to, and unaffected by, what has happened (or not 
happened) in other policy areas. However, there are some 
glimmers of hope which suggest that this compartmen-
talised approach to policy implementation may be shift-
ing with evidence of a growing interest in learning from 
implementation support approaches. This was especially 
notable in the development of the respective support pro-
grammes for the Care Act 2014 and NHS Vanguards initia-
tive (Billings et al., 2019; Checkland et al., 2019; Coleman 
et al., 2020). In the case of the latter, this research com-
menced upon completion of our study of the Care Act 
IS programme and was informed by our work. Findings 
from our study are echoed in those emerging from the 
Manchester-based Vanguards study.
The Care Act Implementation Support 
Programme: Did it Work?
The findings from our research are structured around the 
six criteria set out in the assessment framework based on 
McConnell’s work (see Figure 1):
1. Helping to secure policy legitimacy: to understand 
how far, and in what ways, the creation of the IS pro-
gramme had itself helped to shape the legitimacy 
of the policy, namely, the Care Act 2014. In some 
important respects the quest for policy legitimacy 
around the Care Act was facilitated by the general 
view that parts of the legislation consisted of legal 
‘tidying’, bringing together separate requirements 
that had accreted since the 1948 National Assistance 
Act. Other parts of the Act were more challenging 
requiring, for example, a new focus on  wellbeing, 
prevention, self-care, and market-shaping. The most 
visible manifestation of policy legitimacy at a na-
tional level was the signing of a memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) between the DHSC, LGA, and 
ADASS. The MoU was proposed, in the words a sen-
ior civil servant, to ‘…document this vision for co-
ownership of the programme’. Another senior civil 
servant claimed that the MoU provided legitimacy 
through the ‘…formalisation of joint working’. Final-
ly, it also provided for a degree of transparency to the 
joint working arrangements between stakeholders.
  For the purposes of securing legitimacy at the meso 
(regional) level, the importance of the Regional Coor-
dinator role was highlighted. It was viewed as an essen-
tial ‘go-between’ from the centre to the local provid-
ing, as one regional coordinator put it, the ‘…conduit 
from the centre through into the regions and out into 
councils’ and facilitating rapid information exchange. 
In addition to intensive collaboration between the 
macro and meso levels, the funding made available at 
regional level, although not substantial, was crucial to 
the success of the implementation process. At a time 
of austerity which hit local government finances espe-
cially hard, the implementation funding ‘made a lot of 
difference’ according to a regional coordinator.
  At the micro (local) level, it is important to em-
phasise that the concepts underlying the Care Act al-
ready had widespread support within many local au-
thorities. To that extent the Act could be regarded as 
going with, rather than against, the grain of organi-
sational and professional thinking. The information 
flow between all three levels – national, regional, 
and local – was praised and viewed to be very much 
a two-way process. The engagement of the LGA and 
ADASS was especially welcomed since it meant that 
the messages being communicated to the local level 
had been developed with the wider policy field and 
not just within DHSC. This wider engagement from 
bodies with ‘clout’ helped to secure policy legitima-
cy at the local level. National communication tools 
were well-received in the main and avoided the need 
for reinvention locally.
  To some extent, the marked degree of consensus 
around the Care Act and its aims and objectives limit 
what can be learned from this particular case study 
about the value of implementation support pro-
grammes. However, the existence of a policy consen-
sus should not be equated with a ‘simple’ implemen-
tation path. The Care Act represented a formidable 
challenge to established ways of working and this 
complexity constituted the justification for creat-
ing the IS programme. Our fieldwork suggests that 
the support arrangements were successful in help-
ing to secure legitimacy for both the Care Act and 
for the support programme itself. Although there 
were some concerns about detail and practicality, 
there was little or no suggestion that the support 
programme was unnecessary, unwanted, or in any 
way lacking in legitimacy.
2. Developing stakeholder support: the nature and ex-
tent of stakeholder engagement, including whether 
all key partners had been involved and the terms of 
their engagement in the IS programme. As noted 
above in terms of securing policy legitimacy, our 
fieldwork suggested that the relationship between 
the three key national stakeholders (DHSC, LGA, and 
ADASS) was highly successful. This is not an achieve-
ment that should be taken lightly – the national, lo-
cal, and professional voices in social care have often 
been in disagreement over the general direction of 
social and economic policies. A key aspect of this re-
lationship was the decision to engage the key stake-
holders in the policy design process as well as the 
policy implementation arrangements, thereby ena-
bling a degree of co-production of the policy from 
the outset. As a Director of Adult Social Services com-
mented, it was a ‘…genuinely collective effort’, which 
heralded a new approach for social care. In the words 
of a local government national officer, the approach 
gave rise to ‘…more rounded thinking’. Nevertheless, 
this respondent made the point that the partner-
ship was only ‘…collaborative up to a point and then 
[DHSC] ownership sometimes did kick in’.
  At regional and local levels there was a positive re-
sponse to the development of stakeholder support. 
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An operational staff member expressed it in these 
terms: ‘...we’re all learning different languages, dif-
ferent agendas, different roles, how can we pull all 
this together and do something collectively, rather 
than each of us having to go through the same learn-
ing process, can we speed it up because we haven’t 
got very long to do it in…’.
  Securing a workable balance between the legis-
lative authority and the implementing agencies is 
a complex area. It was clear to all involved that ul-
timate authority lay with the DHSC and that com-
pliance with law, regulation and guidance was the 
bottom line. Yet this primus inter pares status was 
rarely raised as a problem by other stakeholders. 
There was little or no reservation expressed about 
how this model had worked out in practice and we 
were not able to identify any comparable achieve-
ment in other policy domains. The incorporation of 
a regional support mechanism generally served to 
strengthen these achievements, especially by draw-
ing upon networks of local stakeholders. Only a few 
interviewees expressed problems with the develop-
ment of stakeholder support and these concerned 
patchy and/or uneven support and problems with 
bringing in external consultants who did not always 
understand local context. Overall, the Care Act IS 
programme scores highly when assessed against 
stakeholder engagement.
3. Clarity of programme contribution: to understand 
more about two things – whether effective use was 
made of the implementation ‘products’ commis-
sioned by the programme, and whether there was 
clarity over the aims of the support programme. A 
battery of products – guidance, events, factsheets, 
and more – was rapidly commissioned by the pro-
gramme and offered, or distributed to, the imple-
menting agencies. These flows of information were 
widely seen as helpful in averting the need for im-
plementing localities to create their own products 
for local consumption. The experience and profile 
of the regional lead was regarded as important in 
terms of the clarity of the programme contribution. 
Having experience of local government in order to 
be able to provide effective leadership was viewed as 
especially important.
  However, there are bound to be limits over the 
extent to which centrally commissioned support 
products and other arrangements can meet all of 
the eventualities likely to be encountered at local 
level. In view of this, and not surprisingly, concerns 
were raised about timeliness, customisation to lo-
cal contexts, and the extent to which the products 
filtered down to operational staff. Across the case 
study sites, a mix of approaches to implementation 
was discernible. While some areas relied heavily on 
regional level support, others did not appear to en-
gage with the region but instead opted to use the 
national products to provide clarification on imple-
mentation. There were also issues over the length 
of time support arrangements were in place. Many 
valued them not only in the short-term, but also felt 
they had value longer-term. As a local operational 
staff member commented: ‘…I think what’s inter-
esting is that the necessary resources just went up 
to the inception [of the Care Act]. I don’t think any 
thought has been given to whether there are any re-
sources you now need to ensure it’s embedded’. This 
was endorsed by a senior manager who suggested 
that after a couple of years or so it would be useful 
to assess ‘what’s worked, what hasn’t and what sup-
port can we do to try and shift upstream because 
you’re all too focused downstream still’.
  When it came to clarity over the aims of the sup-
port programme, the key tension was between a 
perception of the programme as helping localities to 
solve problems and build implementation capacity 
on the one hand, and managing performance on the 
other. These two elements – carrot and stick – do not 
sit easily together. They conflicted most prominently 
in relation to the ‘stocktaking’ exercises where local 
authorities were required to self-assess their pre-
paredness for Care Act implementation on a wide 
range of dimensions. From the perspective of the 
centre – and perhaps especially at a political level – 
the stocktake findings could be viewed as necessary 
indicators of progress that could justify investment 
in the IS programme. On the other hand, localities 
could – and often did – view them as a means of un-
wanted attention that could result in some form of 
‘naming and shaming’ exercise. This led to some ele-
ment of ‘gaming’ whereby local authorities assessed 
themselves as neither doing well or badly in order 
to avoid attracting attention. Implementation sup-
port programmes will arguably struggle to achieve 
their aims if the agencies they are designed to sup-
port feel uncertain about the true purpose of their 
intentions.
4. Comprehension of complexity: extent to which the 
support programme was felt able to get to grips 
with the realities of implementing a complex policy. 
It is well known that successful change is at least as 
much (if not more) about bottom-up behaviour than 
top-down prescription; that local contexts (history, 
tradition, culture, personalities) can filter out stand-
ardised expectations and requirements; and that 
most policies – and certainly this one – are char-
acterised by complexity rather than simplicity. In 
short, there is an issue around the ways in which an 
implementation support programme understands 
and responds to the complexity of the implementa-
tion environment. This is especially evident where 
local government is concerned since it can lead, in 
the words of a senior civil servant, to a ‘…clash be-
tween national accountability and democratic local 
authority’. The issue was compounded in the case 
of the central team which had little experience of 
working with local authorities. Another aspect of 
the complexity surrounding the implementation 
of the Care Act was the dual roles of the LGA and 
ADASS acting simultaneously as partners and lob-
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byists. A senior civil servant expressed the problem 
in these terms: ‘…there was this wonderful situation 
where we were working as a partnership within a 
programme context but outside the programme you 
would have lobbying…so sometimes it was difficult…
for example where they are being torn in two differ-
ent directions’.
  It is unrealistic to expect a national government 
department to be in touch with, and have a detailed 
understanding of, around 150 local implementation 
agencies (councils) each with its own history, cul-
ture, and democratic governance. Indeed, when na-
tional representatives were despatched to speak to 
localities there were some concerns expressed about 
a lack of credibility. It was for this reason that a deci-
sion was taken at national level to insert a regional 
dimension into the national support programme. 
Some modest funding was found to establish this 
level of support and by and large the regional leads 
were left free to determine their own ways of work-
ing. The regional input also allowed local authorities 
to find out what their peers were doing and what 
lessons could be learned. The regional leads were 
well-placed to circulate knowledge and secure local 
authority ‘buy-in’. As a regional coordinator noted: 
if the programme was locally developed then local 
authorities would be ‘…more willing to put the time 
in because they’ve chosen those priorities’. It helped 
if the regional leads understood the pressures direc-
tors of adult social services were under which could 
affect how far they struggled with implementation 
or were able to make rapid progress.
  In view of the above comments, it is perhaps 
not surprising that our fieldwork suggested that in 
some localities the regional tier ended up having a 
significance that far exceeded expectations. Where 
they worked well, the regional leads were highly re-
garded with expressions such as ‘the driving force’ 
and ‘breathing life’ into the implementation process 
being used. With their local knowledge, for example, 
regional leads could be in a position to explain why 
some localities might be faring better or worse on 
the stocktake exercises; in doing so they would also 
be better placed to offer tailored support.
  Such was the popularity of the regional support 
mechanism in our northern fieldwork sites that we 
also heard calls for its continuation into the post-
implementation stage, even for consideration to be 
given to a permanent forum for implementation, 
improvement, and innovation. Much depends here 
upon the skills and experience of those working at 
this level. Working in the interstices between central 
government and local implementation agencies, act-
ing as the eyes and ears of both levels, is a complex 
task. We heard recurring reference to some of the 
required personal qualities such as trust, knowledge, 
experience and professional credibility. We know that 
such skills are not in plentiful supply. There are some 
important issues to be unpicked here around devel-
oping the right skills for such roles to be undertaken.
  At a local level, there could still be tensions be-
tween a national aspiration for a ‘bells and whis-
tles’ implementation and those local authorities 
preferring a more minimalist approach in order to 
ensure ‘compliance’. As a senior manager put it: ‘…
you would get central [DHSC and LGA] talking best 
practice and, really, encouraging everybody to go 
full out. And it took quite some soul searching to say 
it’s OK to just be compliant in some areas’.
  Some of our field site local managers felt that 
the complexities of implementation were not fully 
grasped by the centre. In particular, tight timescales 
for understanding and implementing the reforms 
posed a challenge. A senior manager reflected 
that ‘…it was quite hectic for staff. There was a lot 
of learning that they needed to undertake, a lot of 
workshops that they needed to attend which were 
compulsory… . So, at the time I think it was quite 
stressful for staff. They were quite anxious…’.
  It can be said that the Care Act IS programme cre-
ated many issues for local authorities particularly in 
regard to the appropriate timing of support from 
the centre and how far the programme understood 
and was able to respond to the complexity of the im-
plementation environment. As noted, the regional 
level was critical in bridging and mediating between 
the national and local levels.
5. Sustaining political support: degree to which the 
policy has the support (or at least the acquiescence) 
of legislators in order to come to fruition. Our field-
work was limited by the absence of contact with na-
tional level politicians, though we did include the 
major national figures at a non-political level. It is 
understandable that politicians will want evidence 
that policies in which they have invested are pro-
ducing ‘results’. In the case of the Care Act, the most 
obvious means of such confirmation was the results 
of the stocktake exercises and, as indicated above, 
this conflation of the support and performance 
management roles of the support programme was 
a source of consternation for localities. However, 
more nuanced messages could – and were – sent to 
ministers from the Programme Board, and respons-
es were received. To this extent the very existence of 
the IS programme could be said to have helped sus-
tain political support by keeping open channels of 
communication between political and non-political 
actors.
  There was little discussion of sustaining politi-
cal support at the local level for the Care Act an ac-
knowledgement, perhaps, that it was a piece of 
national legislation which had already gained high 
level support. It was therefore taken as a given that 
it would be implemented at local level and did not 
require further political support at that level. Al-
though we undertook fieldwork with local authority 
cabinet leads, we were unable to discern any clear lo-
cal strategies for political support of the legislation.
6. Contributing to attainment of policy objectives: ex-
tent to, and the ways in, which the IS programme 
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assisted in contributing to the attainment of policy 
objectives. This proved difficult to ascertain in this 
case given that the IS programme was not designed 
to ensure the policy made progress in achieving its 
ends; rather it was timetabled to cease once the le-
gal deadlines for implementation had been reached. 
This means the IS programme could only reasonably 
be assessed on the narrower indicator of ensuring 
‘implementation readiness’ on the part of the re-
sponsible agencies.
  Notwithstanding some of the difficulties identi-
fied in our fieldwork, it is fair to conclude that the 
programme did significantly help to ensure imple-
mentation readiness. One operational staff member 
commented on how the Care Act ‘oiled the wheels in 
terms of giving us greater momentum behind those 
changes in terms of which we were already moving 
towards that emphasis on prevention, early inter-
vention, giving people the skills so they could func-
tion more independently…’. Some of our respond-
ents at local level felt that elements of the Care Act 
were better supported than others. For example, 
despite the centrality of prevention and wellbeing 
as underpinning principles of the Act, they were not 
always perceived to be to the fore within the sup-
port provided. No reasons were identified for these 
gaps.
  The most commonly expressed concerns were 
about the mismatch between the ambitions of the 
legislation and the impact of severe funding restric-
tions on local authority spending. We encountered 
strong feelings that the austerity programme was 
rendering unattainable the key operating principles 
of the Care Act, such as independence, wellbeing, 
and prevention; rather, localities felt they were be-
ing effectively confined to responding to crisis situa-
tions. A local operational staff member put it in the 
following terms when talking about the impact of 
austerity on implementation: ‘the current trick, of 
course, which is a very neat trick of central govern-
ment, is to sort of talk about localism and say well 
what we think is local authorities are better placed 
to do this. And they’ll give you the power and the 
responsibility and maybe a quarter of the money or 
a half of the money. And quite rightly people are go-
ing like well I blame the local authority. It’s sort of 
an underhand trick that’s been done on everybody’. 
This criticism highlights the difficulties that arise 
when a policy that is collaboratively designed, popu-
lar with the receiving audience, and supported by an 
implementation programme is not properly funded 
to achieve its objectives. An implementation sup-
port programme, no matter how good, may be best 
regarded as a necessary but not a sufficient factor in 
securing policy objectives.
Discussion
From the outset it was acknowledged that the Care Act 
was a complex and ambitious piece of legislation and 
that implementation would not be easy, especially being 
dependent on diverse contexts and the involvement of 
multiple stakeholders each presenting specific chal-
lenges well identified in the policy literature (Davies et al., 
2008, Russell et al., 2008). The approach adopted in the 
Care Act IS programme built on the collaborative nature 
of the development of the Act itself and involved key 
national stakeholders working in partnership to develop 
and support the implementation process. The range of 
support mechanisms employed within the implemen-
tation approach set the Care Act apart from previous 
policies reviewed in this study and briefly described 
earlier.
Four key concerns guided the research:
•	 How the Care Act IS programme may support the re-
design of local services and systems to improve the 
provision of care and support, to improve quality and 
reduce risks to delivery;
•	 How, and to what extent, centrally commissioned or 
developed implementation support, including the 
Care Act IS programme, is supporting local changes;
•	 Identifying effective practice in implementation, and 
‘what works’ in terms of service redesign and provi-
sion; and
•	 Identifying potentially transferable lessons that may 
be useful or relevant to other local government re-
form programmes.
These concerns need to be viewed through a complex 
adaptive systems lens since the context, or system, within 
which a policy is implemented is never static. Systems 
are viewed as self-organising and emergent from within 
complex structures and there is therefore a need to com-
prehend and interpret the relationships between the ele-
ments which make up the ‘system’ in order to understand 
‘what works’ (Westhorp, 2012). Within a complex system, 
interactions are generally non-linear, that is, an action 
does not always have the same outcome as the result is 
dependent on the context within which the interactions 
occur. In addition, emergent behaviours are often unpre-
dictable, due mainly to the influence of people who will 
react differently to the same situation (Williams, 2015). 
This may be because they are subject to differing pres-
sures and expectations reflecting the particular power 
plays operating in any given situation.
Policy sets the context within which those with a remit 
for its delivery must make crucial decisions on the shape 
of implementation. In everyday parlance it is often said 
that things should not be ‘taken out of context’. This 
similarly applies to policy implementation, since there 
is now a growing body of evidence that an intervention 
that is successful in one location does not deliver the same 
results elsewhere (Health Foundation, 2014; Horton et al., 
2018). As Dixon-Woods (2014: p.89) points out: ‘History is 
littered with examples of showpiece programmes that do 
not consistently manage to export their success beyond 
the home soil of early iterations’.
All of this connects with the long-standing literature 
on ‘receptive’ and ‘non-receptive’ contexts for change pio-
neered by Pettigrew et al. (1992). The quintessential task 
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of implementation support could therefore be said to 
be to assist the organisational shift towards a ‘receptive’ 
implementation context. Weiner (2009) describes this as 
‘organisational readiness’ for change – a state of being 
both psychologically and behaviourally able and willing 
to take action in a desired direction. Of relevance here is 
the health system transformation initiative launched by 
WHO Europe, which includes a self-assessment check-
list to enable policy-makers to reflect upon, and assess, 
their readiness for change and whether or not the requi-
site capacities and capabilities are in place for successful 
implementation to occur (WHO, 2018).
It is therefore likely that the implementation sup-
port process will more easily flourish in some contexts 
than others – indeed a recurring theme throughout this 
account has been the receptive political and professional 
context within which the Care Act IS programme func-
tioned. Not all policies can be expected to be character-
ised by such a high degree of political and professional 
agreement and engagement; in fact, most will almost 
certainly be the outcome of divisive and contentious 
disagreements.
A useful framework for understanding the role of con-
text is Matland’s (1995) classic work on the impact of 
conflict and ambiguity on implementation. The premise 
is that the different characteristics of policies have vary-
ing implications for the way they are implemented – and, 
by extension, for the ways in which implementation sup-
port programmes might best be constructed. Matland 
uses a distinction between issues about the extent of 
policy ambiguity on the one hand, and issues about policy 
conflict on the other, to develop the matrix below (see 
Table 2).
There are important implications arising from this anal-
ysis for ensuring the right model of policy implementa-
tion support is associated with each domain of the matrix. 
Broadly we can hypothesise that:
•	 Administrative Implementation is amenable to a mod-
el associated with guidance, regulation, and top-down 
performance management.
•	 Political Implementation is amenable to a model as-
sociated with guidance, regulation, and performance 
management but will also require flexibility and col-
laborative working.
•	 Experimental Implementation is amenable to a model 
associated with a bottom-up approach, sensitivity to 
the implementation context, and support for prob-
lem-solving.
•	 Symbolic Implementation is amenable to a model asso-
ciated with the same features as experimental imple-
mentation but may also require support for capacity 
building.
These categories are not mutually exclusive – policies 
could contain several elements – but the task of policy-
makers and practitioners is nevertheless to determine 
which policies require what mix of support to give them 
the best chance of effective implementation.
In the case of the Care Act, the policy is probably best 
understood as ‘experimental implementation’. Although 
the passage of the legislation was characterised by rela-
tively low conflict, it incorporated some new and largely 
untested ideas that were always likely to be open to inter-
pretation – high ambiguity. In these circumstances a 
bottom-up approach showing sensitivity to local context 
alongside support for problem-solving was (in line with 
Matland’s hypothesis) the correct approach.
Limitations
A limitation of our research is that it was undertaken 
after the IS programme had closed and while this had the 
advantage of allowing time for reflection, it also meant we 
were, to some extent, dependent upon participants’ recall 
of past events. A second possible limitation of our research 
Table 2: Matland’s Model of Conflict, Ambiguity and Implementation.




•	 low ambiguity and low conflict
•	 the pre-requisite conditions for a rational 
decision process are in place
•	 an activity associated with a generally shared 
and straightforward objective
•	 suitable for the application of a top-down 
approach
•	 key organising concept: resources
POLITICAL IMPLEMENTATION
•	 low ambiguity but high conflict
•	 a straightforward but strongly contested activity
•	 amenable to interaction and feedback
•	 implementation outcomes determined by the 
location of authority




•	 high ambiguity but low conflict
•	 a complex policy domain where cause-effect 
mechanisms are uncertain
•	 environmental influences likely to be important; 
different organisations implement different 
policies
•	 bottom-up approaches likely to be important
•	 key organising concept: context
SYMBOLIC IMPLEMENTATION
•	 high conflict and high ambiguity
•	 an absence of clarity about what can be achieved
•	 no strong coalition to create progress
•	 significant professional values and  allegiances
•	 neither top nor bottom stakeholders committed
•	 key organising concept: collaborative strength
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was its restricted coverage to six local authorities that may 
have not been typical of developments elsewhere. How-
ever, we do not consider this to be a major drawback since, 
given the complexity of local government, no two authori-
ties are likely to be the same in every respect.
Conclusion
Overall, it can be concluded that the Care Act IS pro-
gramme significantly helped ensure the implementation 
readiness of local agencies. Key successes identified for the 
IS programme relate to its securing policy legitimacy, the 
successful navigation of complex issues through stake-
holder engagement, and ensuring the readiness of local 
implementation agencies.
Stakeholder engagement at a macro (national) level was 
regarded as the key feature of the IS programme. The close 
relationships secured between the key national stakehold-
ers (DHSC, LGA, ADASS) were unique with no comparable 
example found in the other policy domains we reviewed. 
The approach demonstrated engagement, drawing on 
existing relationships, brought in external expertise as 
required, facilitated the sharing of ideas and avoided a 
traditional mechanistic and top-down way of working by 
seeking a more flexible and adaptive approach influenced 
by the needs of regional leads and local service providers.
Given the relative novelty of the Care Act IS programme 
with its particular features that are not replicated in other 
policy domains, there is correspondingly little empiri-
cal evidence to draw upon, making the evidence base 
for implementation support programmes thin. There 
are three key messages arising from the Care Act IS pro-
gramme we studied:
•	 Ensure the common ground developed with key 
stakeholders at the preparation stage is also applied 
to those putting policies into effect in managerial and 
professional roles: understanding bottom-up discre-
tion and dilemmas;
•	 Recruitment and development of a cadre of experi-
enced and trusted ‘implementation brokers’ to offer 
support tailored to local contexts; and
•	 Offer implementation support where it is needed or 
requested: ongoing assistance with problem-solving 
and capacity-building to develop sustainable imple-
mentation skills and knowledge.
Underpinning everything the research investigated and 
its findings is the irrefutable evidence that the Care Act 
was in large part a popular piece of legislation amongst 
sector organisations that generated a great deal of stake-
holder consensus. This cannot be said of all policy and 
therefore inevitably limits what can be learned from this 
study alone about the wider potential of policy support 
programmes. But if nothing else, the findings reported 
here demonstrate the potential value of implementation 
support if making policy stick is a desired outcome. It is 
clearly a topic that merits further investigation, especially 
at a time when government’s ability to find lasting solu-
tions to complex ‘wicked’ problems has perhaps never 
been so tested and under such scrutiny.
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